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MANAGEMENT CONTROLS IN FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES 
(FOBs): A CASE STUDY OF AN INDONESIAN FAMILY-OWNED 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper reports on the results of a case study of management controls in an 
Indonesian family-owned University. The paper attempts to understand the nature and 
dynamics of management controls in the operations of the University. Data for the 
analyses are gathered from multiple sources including document analysis, 
observations and semi-structured interviews. The findings of the case study showed 
that culture and social relations are very instrumental in the management of the 
University (Ansari and Bell, 1991). Decisions such as recruitment, rewards, 
performance evaluation, and resource allocations are often made in cognizance of 
social and cultural factors. The strong influence of culture and social relations in the 
organization thus made formal management controls less relevant. These findings 
have implications for understanding management controls in FOBs especially in the 
developing world.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The study stems from an interest in family controlled business and the role of 
controls therein. The paper attempts to elucidate the nature and dynamics of 
management controls in Family-Owned Businesses (FOBs) especially in the 
context of a less developed country (LDC). It reports on the results of a case study 
on management controls in an Indonesian private University owned by two 
Javanese families. The study is motivated by the lack of research on management 
control issues in FOBs, particularly in LDCs (Ansari and Bell, 1991; Chan, et al., 
2001). The paper contributes to the emerging management accounting literature in 
LDCs (Uddin and Hopper, 2001, 2003).  
 
The importance of FOBs in the economies of both the developed and the developing 
world has been extensively discussed in the literature (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; 
Shanker, and Astrachan, 1996; Klein, 2000; Poza, 1995; Corbetta, 1995). In this 
study, family owned business is defined as a business owned and run by members of 
one or two families (Stern, 1986, p.xxi)1. According to Narva and Dreux (1996) 
family owned businesses can be for-profit or not-for-profit, foundations or investment 
groups (hence family run educational institutions fall under the ambit of FOBs).  
 
The proportion of businesses broadly classified as FOBs varies from country to 
country. In Indonesia, it has been reported that FOBs contribute as much as 82% of 
the country’s GNP (Faustine, 2001). In a recent study, Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) 
also emphasized the increasing role of FOBs in Indonesia and other South East Asia 
economies. These FOBs are located across different industries such as manufacturing, 
retailing, banking, and education. Private family-owned Universities are central to the 
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development of higher education in Indonesia and in other Asian economies. Altbach 
(2002) argued that while only 20 percent of U.S. enrolments are at private colleges 
and universities, in several Asian countries (including Indonesia) the figure is as high 
as 80 percent. The author noted that: “Many [Asian private universities] are owned by 
individuals or families, sometimes with a formal management that masks the 
controlling elements of the school’s governance structure. This pattern of family-run 
academic institutions has received little if any attention from analysts, although it is a 
phenomenon of growing importance worldwide even in countries that do not 
encourage the establishment of for-profit higher education institutions” (p.10). The 
majority of the FOBs in Indonesia are owned by the Indonesian-Chinese minority2. 
However, recent years have seen the emergence of indigenous Indonesian Javanese as 
FOB entrepreneurs. As argued by Rademakers (1998), the extant literature on FOBs 
in South East Asia (including Indonesia) is dominated by the 'Chinese family 
business' (CFB) management system which has been found to be distinct from other 
similar business systems such as the Korean chaebol and the Japanese keiretsu and 
sogo sosha (see also Whitley 1992). Little empirical evidence is therefore available on 
managerial issues in indigenous Indonesian FOBs.  Thus, the paper examines the 
following research issues: 
 
1. Dynamics of management control processes in a family owned business 
2. The influence of societal culture on management control processes 
 
Controls can be formal or informal. Formal controls consist of high levels of output 
and process controls such as budgeting, performance measurement, incentive systems 
and other administrative roles. Informal controls consist of high levels of professional 
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and cultural controls such as laws, norms, ethics, etiquette, and customs, which define 
behavior. While both types of controls may be present in organizations (Jaworski, 
1988) the use of informal controls have been found to be more prevalent in 
developing countries (see for instance, Ansari and Bell, 1991; Hoque and Hopper, 
1994; and Dean, 2001).  Control processes in our paper refer to formal functional 
roles within the organization including budgeting, performance measurement, 
incentive systems and other administrative roles and also informal processes designed 
to achieve organizational objectives. 
 
We are particularly interested in how these formal roles are achieved via informal 
processes and the way in which the larger cultural context mediates these roles 
(Ansari and Bell, 1991). Very few accounting studies, especially in the context of 
LDCs, have studied management controls in a family owned business. In a recent 
study, Chan et al., (2001), examined how management controls operated in two 
eminent family Chinese households during the 18th century. The authors presented 
evidence to show that accounting was implicated in the decision making of the 
families. One of the most detailed studies conducted on management controls in 
FOBs is that of Ansari and Bell (1991). Using a longitudinal case study, the 
authors investigated the influence of societal culture on the accounting and 
control practices of a Pakistani FOB. The findings of this study suggest that in 
addition to the rational economic view, the design of accounting and control 
systems in the organization could be explained from a cultural perspective.    
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This paper draws heavily on cultural perspectives of control, given the importance of 
various cultural and societal values on controls in LDCs’ enterprises (Gray, 1988; 
Rademakers, 1998; Dean, 2001; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2004; Pourjalali and 
Meek, 1995; Lau and Tan, 1998; Brewer, 1998; Harrison et al., 1994). It was felt that 
management control processes were best studied by applying cultural perspectives 
(Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2004; Pourjalali and Meek, 1995) as controls in LDCs, 
which operate in a complex cultural environment where owner-officials realise their 
ends using a series of informal processes on the shop floor and elsewhere (Uddin and 
Hopper, 2001). The study seeks to understand the events in the case study by using 
the cultural perspective adopted by Ansari and Bell, (1991). Our approach to the 
application of cultural values in explaining control practices is not static. It is a study 
of symbolic processes through which people produce and reproduce social order. 
Ansari and Bell (1991) commented that “a critical feature of the approach is the 
emphasis on the native’s viewpoint as it unfolds in the linguistic categories that are 
used to organise experience and give meaning to it”. They added that “culture is 
neither a monolith, as sometimes portrayed in studies that are cross-cultural, nor is it 
invariant over time. It is the dynamic processes of social change that are at the heart of 
cultural studies” (p.8).  
 
Ansari and Bell’s work (1991), based on interpretive anthropology (Geertz, 1978, 
1983), used in this study, has two key features. First, it relies on linguistic 
categories and idiom. In this paper, a number of key idioms or phrases are used 
which drive our explanations. Second, it uses kinship and clan structures to 
explain events. For example we provide evidence to illustrate how family 
members are looked after through employment in own business. Geertz (1978) 
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recommended the application of the anthropological tradition in data collection to 
understand the influence of linguistic and idioms, and kinship and clan structure 
on organisational and social practices [see Ansari and Bell’s paper]. One of the 
authors worked for the business that is the subject of the present case study for 
several years.  Our data not only consist of interviews and conversations but also 
personal observations (see research method section for details). 
 
The application of an anthropological understanding of culture is not a new 
concept in management accounting literature, but the contribution of this paper is 
to apply it in the context of a less developed family owned business. This paper 
aims to contribute to the emerging literature on management control and family 
ownership, especially for LDCs. Theoretically, the paper demonstrates the 
usefulness of culture in explaining management control processes in LDCs. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
research methods. This is followed by sections on political and socio-cultural 
contexts of Indonesia; and brief overview of Higher Education in Indonesia and 
the background of the University. The next section then presents the empirical 
findings. The last section provides discussions and conclusions. 
 
2. METHODS 
 
There is an increasing emphasis by management accounting researchers on the 
adoption of an organizational perspective and interaction with a variety of 
organizational participants in order to illuminate the dynamics of management 
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accounting practices (Burchell et al., 1980; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Hopwood 
1978). The approach adopted here follows this perspective. Although we did not start 
with an a priori model to guide data collection, the cultural perspective adopted here 
seemed more appropriate to understand the control practices at this university.  
 
The study is based on a field study to explore management controls in their 
organizational context (Flamholtz 1983). The study uses a qualitative methodology 
where data are gathered from personal observations, interviews and document 
analysis. One of the authors worked at this University for three consecutive years 
(1999-2002) during the summer term (June – August). However, formal interviews 
and documentation started in June 2003 and lasted for three months. In addition to 
personal observations, the research involved interviews with the University 
officials/managers. At the initial stage, interviews were conducted with the finance 
manager and three other staff of the Finance Department. In addition, documents such 
as budget reports, financial statements, minute of meetings and stock control reports 
were reviewed. The next stage of the study involved semi-structured interviews with 
15 people. These include 5 administrative heads, 3 faculty members, and 7 lower level 
employees. The interviewees were thus selected from various departments including 
finance, human resource, purchasing, academic and general affairs. Interviews with 
each participant lasted an average of two hours. Interviews and discussions with 
interviewees focused on issues such as finance and control practices and other 
organisational practices, the influence of the owners in control system design and use, 
and the participation of subordinates in control system design. Notes were taken 
during the interviews as tape recording was not permitted. The final stage of the 
research involved a review of relevant internal and external documents such as 
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university manuals, minutes of executive meetings, organizational structure and the 
Indonesian higher education act.  
 
3. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF INDONESIA 
 
The name Indonesia was derived from Greek name "indos nesos", meaning 
islands near India. Five main islands and 30 smaller island clusters are the 
homelands for most Indonesians. These main islands include Borneo, Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Java. Java is about the size of New York State and is 
the home of over 70% of Indonesia’s total population (CIA, 2003). Thus, over 
70% of the population – or over 120 million people – live on the island of Java, 
which accounts for only 6.9% of the landmass of Indonesia. United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) statistics ranked Indonesia in terms of the Human 
Development Index (HDI) in 2002 as 110th out of 120 countries indicating that the 
country has low income levels, low levels of education, and poor health.  
 
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world with more than 230 
million people (July 2002)3. It is populated by more than 300 ethnic groups speaking 
literally thousands of dialects, with one mother tongue called ‘Bahasa’ (a modified 
form of Malay)4. The country contains different ethnic groups such as Javanese 
(45%), Sundanese (14%), Madurese (7.5%), coastal Malays (7.5%) and other ethnic 
groups (26%). The different social and cultural groups are naturally isolated from 
each other due to the geography of the region. 
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Indonesian culture is an intermixture of influences from many diverse 
civilizations, which include: Hinduism and Buddhism, which arrived from India 
during the early first century AD; the Arabic influence during the 13th century, 
mainly through the teachings of Islam; and also the South-East Asian and 
Polynesian cultures, as well as influences from the influx of Chinese and Dutch 
people.   
 
Religion and religious freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution. Indonesia 
has been influenced by most of the world's major religions, which were first 
introduced to the coastal areas and subsequently spread inland. Islam, in various 
forms, is the faith of about 88 per cent of the population, and Indonesia is the world's 
most populous Muslim nation. Christianity is the largest of the minority religions with 
almost 9 per cent of the population; about two-thirds are Protestants. Buddhism is 
practiced by about 2 per cent of the population, most of who are of Chinese 
background. Hinduism, once the predominant religion, is now practiced by only about 
2 per cent of the population, principally in Bali; however, Hindu influences remain 
strong within the wider Indonesian culture and society. A variety of indigenous 
religions are still practiced in more remote areas. The influence of Buddhism in 
Indonesia started from the 7th to 14th centuries on the Island of Sumatra. Hinduism 
prevailed in the 14th century in eastern Java, while the Hindu Empire conquered most 
of what is now known as Indonesia. During the 12th century, Islam arrived in 
Indonesia and dominated in Java and Sumatra by the end of the 16th century. 
Although, by the 20th Century, Indonesia became the largest Muslim country in the 
World, Indonesia contains the mixture of multicultural background in customs, 
traditions, institutions and businesses (Geertz, 1972). Basic Indonesian principles in 
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businesses and institutions have been inspired by the various cultural values such as 
the concepts of mutual assistance (gotong royong) and communal meetings and 
gatherings (musyawarah) to arrive at a consensus (mufakat). This system derives from 
the traditions of agriculturally-based rural life, and is still very much in use in 
community life throughout the country (Geertz, 1972).  
 
The Indonesian society is ethnically divided with Javanese as the largest and most 
influential ethnic group. Java is therefore central in the development of modern 
Indonesia. For centuries Java Island has been the cultural, political, and economic 
center of Indonesia. For examples, most of Indonesia's leading higher education 
institutions are located on Java Island and the island also has more development 
than any other island in Indonesia. Although Java constitutes only one seventh of 
the country's total area or the fifth largest island of Indonesia, it contains two 
thirds of the country's population that make it as the most densely populated 
island in Indonesia.  
 
Javanese influence is also linked with the political power in Indonesia. Under 
President Soeharto's5 regime which ruled Indonesia between 1965-1997, 
Indonesians experienced what was commonly known as 'Javanization'. This refers 
to how Javanese beliefs and practices permeated Indonesian political and daily 
lives. The power of Soeharto’s presidency grew stronger over the years to the 
point where it became absolute, and the government and President became more 
autocratic. During this time, Soeharto, his children and other close allies were 
accused of engaging in several corrupt financial dealings. Javanization may well 
be their tool to satisfy the influential section of the society as people from the 
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Javanese ethnic origin were employed in the most important roles in government 
and military. Even after the Soeharto’s regime, the Javanese continue to enjoy 
preferential treatments from the government for setting up new businesses, 
employment and education. This may have led Javanese families to form new 
family owned businesses such as our case study.  
 
4. INDONESIAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE UNIVERSITY 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the Indonesian higher Education Sector 
and then presents some background information about the University in our case 
study. 
 
4.1 Overview of the Indonesian Higher Education Sector 
 
The earliest forms of Indonesian higher learning were mainly Islamic but had 
international links with universities in Egypt. The state’s support in higher 
education during this period was minimal. The earliest private higher Islamic 
institutions founded in as far back as the 1910s and 1920s (Thomas, 1973; Welch 
2006). The first post-independence higher education institution (HEI) in Indonesia 
was Gadjah Madah University, a state university founded in Jogjakarta in 1949 
through the conversion of an earlier private HEI (Welch, 2006). Two other private 
universities, namely the Indonesian Islamic University and the National 
University were established in the immediate post war years (Welch, 2006; 
Buchori & Malik, 2004). There was a huge growth in private HEI in the 1960s as 
a result of the lack of state resources to establish and support state run HEI to 
 13
match the continued demand of higher education in the country (Pardoen, 1998). 
The majority of these private HEIs were however unofficial and unaccredited 
(Thomas, 1973; Welch, 2006). There was weak regulatory regime to control these 
institutions. Between 1975 and 1995 Private HEIs grew from less than 400 to 
around 1,200. Similarly, student enrolments grew from around 100,000 to over 
1.4 million during the same period (Hadijardaja, 1996). By 1998/1999 private 
HEIs accounted for nearly 95% of the total HEIs in the country,  with the current 
ratio of private to public HEIs being about 1,800 to 100 (Welch, 2006).  
 
The lax regulatory regime during 1950 and 1960s was replaced by law No. 30 of 
1990 which, to some extent, provided some guidelines to the private owners of 
universities. A number of institutions were established over the years to control 
private and public HEIs in Indonesia. For example, a Directorate of Private 
Higher Education was established in 1990 to coordinate private HEIs, Offices 
called Kopertis (referring to the Coordination of Private HEIs), act as regulators, 
and to ensure that they conform to relevant acts and regulations (Welch, 2006). 
As argued by Welch (2006), the responsibility of quality control in the private 
sector also rests on the Directorate of Private Higher Education or Koperties, who 
make a formal recommendation to the Minister. There are several Ministries that 
are responsible for higher education in some form: the Ministry of National 
Education (MNE), Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), and various other 
Ministries that have specialist HEIs. There are also some HEIs not under 
Ministerial control. In addition, there is Indonesia’s National Accreditation 
Committee (Badan Akreditasi  Nasional, or BAN) which was  established in 
1998.  
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 In practice, every HEI is meant to be reviewed by BAN each 3–5 years, 
depending on their status.  In brief, private and public institutions are subject to 
several regulatory frameworks and institutions. They also have to submit annual 
reports to various authorities including private higher education authority 
(Koperties) and BAN. Due to lack of resources the institutions such as BAN and 
Koperties failed to establish effective monitoring6 for quality of private education 
and even accommodate all HEIs in the country (Thomas, 1973). There are a 
significant number of private HEIs are not accredited. And geographic dispersal is 
adding to these difficulties—although in the early 1990s, some 25% of all private 
HEIs were still located either in Jakarta (16.4%) or East Java (9.6%), (Pardoen, 
1998, p. 28). The proliferation in recent years of private HEIs, which now exist 
well outside the major cities in which higher education was traditionally 
concentrated, itself presents certain dilemmas. Generally, the problems of 
monitoring private HEIs lead to several particulars concerning government 
policies, quality control and financial matters.’’ (Hadijardaja, 1996, p. 42). 
Nevertheless, our case university is accredited by BAN.  
 
Private HEIs do not receive public monies from government but may be eligible 
for certain forms of subsidy, or incentives, according to pertinent regulations. The 
incentives usually in the form of buildings, but can also be in the form of staff 
seconded from public sector HEIs. All in all, some 10% of private HEI academics 
are paid by government (Buchori & Malik, 2004, p. 251). Student fees are the 
major (often only) incomes, and donations are also sought. Our case study shows 
similar evidence. The main revenue is mainly student fees. 
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Brief Background of the Studied Institution 
 
Our case study is located in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. It was established in 
the late 1960s by two close friends, who are both responsible for its operations 
and management. The University consists of two institutions - a foundation, and 
the University itself. According to Indonesian government regulations, an 
educational institution has to be organized by a foundation since educational 
institutions are non profit-oriented institutions. One of the two friends has the 
responsibility as the Head of the Foundation and the other as the CEO of the 
University. The CEO is the highest decision-maker in the University and is 
responsible for establishing the University’s policies and regulations. The Head of 
the Foundation, on the other hand, is responsible for establishing the University's 
vision, mission, goals, strategy, and planning for the University's financing, 
facilities and infrastructure. The Foundation also has a function of monitoring and 
evaluating the University's programs and activities in addition to the right to 
authorize, control and supervise the annual costs and revenues of the University.  
Formally, the foundation acts as a supervisory board for the university. The CEO 
and the Head consist of the top management of the University.  
 
With an active student body of around 6,000, the University is one of the largest 
private institutions in Indonesia. The University currently employs about 187 
administrative staff and about 132 teaching or academic staff. The workforce is 
divided into: teaching staff (lecturers), research staff, administration staff 
(supporting the teaching and learning process and administrative duties), and 
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cleaning and security services.  The organizational structure of the university is 
provided in figure one below.  
 
[Insert Figure One Here] 
 
In the next section we examine the nature of management controls in the 
university.  
 
5. MANAGEMENT CONTROLS IN THE UNIVERSITY 
 
The Head of the foundation is the formal chief officer of both the foundation and the 
University as a whole but the CEO acts as the top executive manager of the 
University, looking after day-to-day activities. The University has a number of 
functional areas including, finance, academic affairs, internal audit and control, 
purchasing and human resources. All functional departmental officials/managers 
report directly to the CEO, except the Academic affairs manager and treasury. 
Treasury reports to the Head of the foundation. Academic affairs reports to the deputy 
CEO. The following subsections briefly explain some of the important functional 
controls of the university. 
 
5.1 Financial Controls 
 
There are two sets of financial control department – Treasury and Finance. The 
treasury comes under the control of the Head of foundation while finance department 
is under the control of the CEO. The treasury department is responsible for the 
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collection of incomes from various sources including student tuition fees and 
consultancy fees. All funds collected are recorded in a book by the treasurer and paid 
into the institution’s bank account to be used for the financing of University activities. 
The treasury department also issues the payment orders for the finance department to 
pay suppliers, employees etc. In a way, the treasury department, controlled by the 
foundation, is an overseeing department for the finance department. This is due to the 
Indonesian Higher Education Act which requires the foundation to become the 
supervisory board for the university.  
 
The university heavily relies on monthly expenses or requirement budgets.  The 
various departments are required to classify their budgets (requests) into two sets of 
budgets - financial (cash) and non-financial (non-cash). Financial budget requests are 
in the form of money allocated for lecturers, staff and/or students’ activities such as 
conferences, training events, scholarships and sport. All financial budgets must first 
be reviewed and agreed by the CEO. Once approved, the cash request is sent to the 
foundation treasurer. Upon the approval of the head of the foundation, the treasury 
department authorizes the finance department to make the payments.  Regular 
monitoring of budget allocated for staff development is conducted to ensure that the 
University benefits from such funds. One manager noted that: As the University 
accountability report outlines, people attending courses or conferences are obliged to 
produce an article or report presenting the outcome of the training or discourse to 
other employees, including lecturers and students. The recipients of special 
sponsorships are obliged to make reports concerning the progress of their studies 
three times a year.  
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Non-financial budgets are mainly requests for goods such as computers, printers, 
stationery, and other items.  Non-financial budgets can involve routine or non-routine 
item requests. Routine expenditure refers to those items which are requested on a 
regular basis, such as stationery, while non routine items include computers, printers 
and printing cartridges.  The process of developing the monthly budget begins around 
the 25th of every month. It starts with the Finance Manager requesting each unit head 
to determine items needed for the following month. The approach for budget 
approval, however, differs between routine and non-routine expenditures. For routine 
expenditure the Finance Department compiles the budgeted requests, which are 
subsequently sent to the General Affairs Department. This department is responsible 
for evaluating the University’s inventories of goods. If the requested goods are 
currently available in the store, they are issued directly to the requesting department 
without being included in the budget. However, if the goods are not in stock, the 
General Affairs Department instructs the purchasing team to search for appropriate 
suppliers in terms of prices and quality. The purchasing team reports back to the 
Finance Department with a purchasing plan, which is subsequently submitted to the 
foundation for authorization once an appropriate supplier is found.  
 
Routine payments do not require the approval from the CEO. However, the 
purchasing team is obliged to report non-routine requests to the CEO for review. A 
request can be rejected by the CEO if he disagrees with it. After a purchasing request 
has been approved by the CEO, it is brought to the institution’s treasury for 
evaluation, and a cost estimate is sent to the Head of the Foundation for approval. 
After being agreed by the Head, the cost estimate is sent to the treasury, which 
provides the required funds to the finance department. The finance department then 
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pays the supplier directly. If an item is requested after the monthly budget has already 
been agreed, permission has to be sought from both the Head of the Foundation and 
the CEO. Once such authorization has been received, the foundation cashier pays the 
supplier directly on the advice of the purchasing team. The expenditure is then 
accounted for in the following month’s budget.  The interviewees described the 
current monthly budgeting system as a ‘pay as you go’ system. 
 
The University does not make any long-term financial planning. Strategic planning, 
annual budgeting and long term planning, in accounting terms, are therefore non-
existent. Attempts were however made at the beginning of the 2002/2003 financial 
year to introduce annual budgeting into the University. The CEO appointed a 
committee to review the budgeting process and to make recommendations to 
management as to whether any change is necessary. After much consultation, the 
committee recommended the use of annual budgets instead of the current practice of 
reliance only on the monthly budgets. The recommendations also included the need to 
involve all departments in the budgeting process. In September of the same year, 
under the guidance of the Finance manager, all departmental heads produced budgets 
for their activity units for a one-year period. The heads of departments and the finance 
team then had a meeting where the departmental budgets were consolidated into a 
master budget. The CEO however abandoned the annual budgeting system after one 
year of operation. Some of the university officials interviewed commented that the 
CEO was not very enthusiastic about the annual budget. Thus, the institution reverted 
to the monthly budgeting system.  
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 5.2 Other Functional Controls  
 
Internal audit and control seem to be one of the important functional areas which the 
top management of the university focuses their attentions. This is not only because it 
is linked with the budgeting but also because of government regulations which oblige 
the foundation, as organizer of the University, to meet its financial requirements.  To 
meet the requirements, the University has initially set up one department namely 
internal control department to monitor some important activities such as purchasing, 
stock controls and other finance related areas.  
 
Under this department, only one person was responsible for the purchasing function, 
which involves searching for suppliers, making purchases and paying the suppliers. 
However, after complain by some employees about the need for more transparency in 
purchasing, the CEO created a new department called internal audit and control which 
led to the separation of the purchasing function. A four-member purchasing team was 
subsequently appointed by the CEO to be responsible for the activities in the newly 
created department. One manager noted during the interview that: The team members 
are considered reliable by the CEO, so that he is confident that suppliers chosen by 
the team are appropriate. In addition, it has now become a policy that all goods 
deliveries by the general affairs department must be supported by evidence of 
delivery.  The finance department compiles reports on budget implementation in 
departments/activity units, which are sent directly to the CEO with copies to the Head 
of the Foundation, and to the internal audit and control. The internal audit and control 
is also responsible for monitoring all activities relating to human resources, goods and 
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money. A senior university official interviewed summarized the rationale for creating 
the internal audit and control department as: The University has been forced to 
establish the internal audit and control department to detect and combat corruptions 
in all major routine and non-routine functions.  
 
5.3 Performance Measurement 
 
Formally, the head of the human resource department reports to the CEO on 
appointment, promotion, etc. Interviews with the employees seem to be indicating that 
a punitive incentive system existed in the University, for example, salary cut for non 
attendance, etc. One respondent commented that: Such punishment is efficient, and 
was needed by the institution because employees lacked awareness of their obligation 
to work. Before this policy was introduced, many employees, especially lecturers, 
often did not come into the office and some even worked in other institutions. But 
since this new system has been introduced, the majority of employees now attend work 
regularly to avoid the salary reduction.  
 
The university has a committee of 3 members that advises the CEO on salary 
levels. In making its recommendations, the committee pays attention to several 
factors, including the decree of the Education and Culture minister, level of the 
minimum regional wage, the institution's financial condition, and general 
economic conditions such as the level of inflation. The CEO also seeks the 
opinions of the Head of the Foundation in salary decisions. However, the final 
decision about salaries is the prerogative of the CEO.  
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The interviews however suggest that there is lack of transparency in the ways in 
which salary levels and promotions are determined. One head of department noted 
during the interview that: The employees have little knowledge on how allowances 
and salaries are determined. Some are dissatisfied for not knowing how promotion 
and increments are determined.  
 
For some, the CEO’s centralized management approach has been very successful, as 
he has managed to adopt the same approach from the early years of the institution as a 
small university to its present form as one of the largest private Universities in the 
country. This success has increased the CEO’s confidence in the use of centralized 
controls.  This paper seeks to question why centralized controls appeared to work the 
way they do. The following subsections shed light on the informal controls which the 
top management appeared to exercise in all aspects of the institution. 
 
5.4 Social and Informal Controls – The Role of CEO 
 
Officially, the university in many ways resembles institutions in the West in terms of 
rules and routines including the budgeting and control processes. In reality, the 
university combines a low level of formalization (less reliance on written rules) with a 
very high level of informal procedures in its daily activities. Officially, the CEO is 
accountable to the treasury and the foundation. In reality, the CEO dominates the 
whole affairs of the university as will be shown later. Generally, management is based 
on the concept of the family, where employees are more reliant on constructive verbal 
feedback in performing their everyday duties.  Informal and personal controls affected 
all aspects of the institution as will be detailed below. 
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 Officially, the university is supervised by the foundation. In reality, the foundation 
and its Head rarely questions the CEO’s decisions. This has been summed up by a 
manager as: “it is usually happens whatever the CEO seeks to achieve. All decision 
making, supervision, and implementation of everyday business is under the direct 
influence of the CEO except the daily academic affairs”7.  One senior administrator 
commented: The CEO needs approval and support from the foundation and its 
Treasury, it seems to be not an issue to the CEO. Formal meetings are usually 
arranged according to office routines to make important decisions but these meetings 
are dominated by the CEO as many managers opined. Commenting on the 
participation of subordinates in the implementation of control systems, one manager 
noted that: “in everyday activities, officials and employees are only given positions 
and duties that must be performed, without the authority to decide on the solutions to 
problems. Officials and employees conduct duties that must be performed, and all 
problems have to be reported to the CEO, who later decides how to deal with them”.  
 
The CEO’s direct control affected almost all functions including the internal audit and 
control.  Interviews revealed that the CEO often uses informal channel of information 
for monitoring purposes. One manager notes that: If the CEO discovers an 
irregularity in an activity report, the Internal Audit and Control Department is 
ordered to make an audit/evaluation of the report. Irregularities can also be 
discovered by the CEO through the informal information that reaches the CEO’s ear. 
Interviewees noted that the department carries out an audit only if instructed by the 
CEO to do so. One individual manager commented that: The Internal Audit and 
Control Department exists as a formality to comply with government regulations 
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obliging all higher educational institutions to have a department monitoring their 
budgets. At the foundation level, the Head of the Foundation may request the 
foundation treasurer to carry out an audit if he suspects any irregularities in the 
activity report submitted by the University. However, it has been observed during the 
interviews that because the University activity reports are normally reviewed by the 
CEO, the Head of the Foundation generally accepts these reports.  
 
Informal procedures are highly visible when it comes to evaluating the performance 
of subordinates. For example, university administrators interviewed revealed that they 
adopt an approach termed ‘supervising from the outside’ which involves collecting 
information about complaints from the community, students and lecturers or other 
employees concerning the staff member or lecturer. Subordinates often complain that 
there are no strict rules laid out for so called ‘supervising from the outside’. This 
opens up the scopes of excessive discretions by the top officials. Assessment of 
employees’ performance therefore tends to be subjective in nature; relying on the 
existence of complaints about them, conflicts with other officials, and more 
importantly, their loyalty to the CEO8. It is alleged that the position of each official is 
guaranteed if they can meet especially the last criterion. An interviewee described 
loyalty to the CEO as follows: always support each idea, run all policies taken by the 
CEO without any opposition, and always take counsel with the CEO on any activity 
you intend to conduct.  
 
The current form of formal performance appraisals for the university management is 
also facilitated by the apparent lack of a work design for reference/guidance. Some 
managers often claim they don’t have any tangible targets to follow so that 
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performance can be assessed against those targets or goals. The “supervising from 
outside” approach seems to be questioned by some managers. One senior manager, 
however, recognized the need for more formal performance evaluation of officials: 
We have reached a stage where documented evaluation is greatly needed in order to 
be able to conduct corrections, so that mistakes and weaknesses which have occurred 
in the past will not recur in future. This view was however not shared by other 
interviewees as another manager interviewed commented that: “informal controls are 
also necessary in the institution because many employees have familial relations with 
one another”. Nevertheless, this seems to be working smoothly given the CEO’s 
centralized management style.  
 
The CEO plays a considerable role in appointing university managers/heads of 
departments. One manager commented during the interview that “the CEO himself 
assesses candidates’ ability to hold the particular position”. When it is necessary to 
recruit new employees, families of existing employees are always given priority. The 
Head of Foundation and the CEO also provide many opportunities for their families or 
friends to work in the institution. The reason behind this has been traced to the 
Indonesian culture, which is based on the principle that it is the obligation of people in 
positions of advantage to help their family members. Because of this, priority is 
always given to family members in any situation of employee recruitment. This 
approach, however, seem to have some difficulties in resolving problems arising 
between employees using any formal means. The family has to take precedence in any 
conflict resolution. Some interviewees noted that questioning the familial and 
centralized controls will not be in their best interests. For example, a manager argued 
that: “The CEO is one of the founders and owners of this University. Hence, he has 
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every right to influence the University’s daily activities. We have to obey and follow 
him because we will be in a difficult situation if we question his decisions or beliefs”.  
  
Interviewees identified that formal channel of information is overwhelmed by 
informal channel of information within the university. What is commonly referred to 
in the organization as ‘oral culture’ seems to be a very powerful source of vertical 
information. Because of the strength of familial relationships within the institution, 
university employees, from the lowest to the highest level, have direct access to the 
CEO and the Head of the Foundation. One interviewee noted that: The CEO gets 
direct input from employees concerning the activities in this institution. Giving input 
informally direct to the top leaders has often happened in the University, so that the 
CEO does not need to rely on formal controls. Another interviewee added: “In most 
cases, therefore, the CEO knows about all occurrences, however minor they might be, 
even before responsible officials have attempted to resolve them. Often, the CEO 
intervenes in such problems”.  
 
The field-work revealed that the informal controls are also necessitated by the 
apparent lack of clear job descriptions/working plans for departments. In the few 
instances where managers have job descriptions, these are not detailed and have 
usually resulted in individual interpretations of roles. Sometimes however, managers 
consult with the CEO when interpreting their roles. One manager commented that: All 
managers are always expected to take counsel with the CEO if they are not clear 
about their job descriptions. A second manager noted the advantage of this lack of job 
description: The lack of a job description creates flexibility. Managers interpret their 
roles on a day-to-day basis. Because of this, duties given to employees can be said to 
 27
be flexible, in that they can be assigned to help in other parts of the University which 
are particularly busy. Some interviewees argued that informal controls are more 
effective and quicker to implement.  One manager commented that: The use of formal 
control is less preferred by individuals working in this institution because culturally, 
Indonesian people prefer deliberation or face to face encounters in settling a problem, 
and to resolve problems using the family principle. Thus, the nature of actual control 
at the university and the role of the CEO have never been questioned as they reflect 
the social context in which the institution is operating. 
  
6. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the case results we presented above, we argued that while some form of formal 
management controls exists in the organization, in practice they are subservient to 
social and cultural controls. Thus while some form of technical-rational explanations 
could be offered for the control practices, the majority of the controls in the 
organization could be explained based on culture and social relations. Formal 
accounting appears to exist for ritualistic purposes, as most decisions are made 
with little regard for formal accounting data. For example, formal budgeting 
systems were rarely followed in practice. Also, the creation of the internal audit 
control department was mainly to satisfy the Education Ministry’s requirements. 
 
A summary of the influence of the Javanese culture on management controls 
discussed above is provided in table one below. 
 
[Insert Table One Here] 
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 One of the key issues we identified was that there is a high level of centralization 
of power, with authority being traced to a single individual – the CEO. This is not 
surprising as prior studies (Rademakers, 1998; Geertz, 1972) have identified the 
centralization of authority as a key characteristic of the Javanese society. This 
paternalism or 'bapakism' of the Javanese society has therefore shaped 
management controls in the organization. The CEO, who is perceived by most 
employees as a father figure, makes all important decisions and all employees 
have to obey such decisions: the bapak (Mulder 1989). Thus Rademakers (1998: 
6) observes: “This deeply rooted paternalism involves a high degree of 
centralization of power and authority in families, but also in firms and even on 
the state level”. Even though theoretically, the foundation has control over the 
activities of the University, in practice the CEO, who is the head of the 
University, has influence over the Head of the Foundation. The reason for this is 
age is seen as a basis of power in the Javanese society (Rademakers, 1998) and 
the CEO is older than the Head of the Foundation. One manager comments that: 
The Head of Foundation always follows the guidance given by Islamic teaching 
(followed by the Javanese people) to always respect older people and therefore 
respects the CEO. 
 
[Insert Figure Two Here] 
 
The social relationship shown in figure two above explains the actual power 
structure within the organization. This is different from the formal structure 
presented in figure one.  Thus, we argue that culture as an explanatory variable in 
 29
this study is very powerful and able to explain many control practices at the 
University that are the results of cultural values of individual and community. The 
management control practices in the University are significantly shaped by the 
Javanese culture.  
 
Though controls were very centralized and all decisions revolve around the CEO, 
employees, however, respect and accept his position in the organization. Dean 
(2001) argued that in the Javanese society subordinates are expected to respect 
those in authority and are not allowed to question such an authority. Status is 
strictly defined by obligations and responsibilities, which tend to limit movement 
within the network. As Dean (2001: 4) points out: “It will be very uncommon 
indeed for a person lower in the network to overtake their patron in terms of rank 
or income”. Whitfield (2003) found similar results in Indonesia. In a situation 
where there is a clear superior, that person decides. Higher posts have a very high 
status in Indonesian organizations. This will influence the way that Indonesian 
employees treat him and he must understand and respect the obligations that his 
status places upon him (Whitfield, 2003).  
 
The importance of family ties and hierarchy within the Indonesian context 
especially Javanese has also been identified by other studies (Rademakers, 1998; 
Dean, 2001). As the case illustrated, staff recruitment was based substantially on 
social relations. Preference is given to family members of the CEO and the Head 
of Foundation, to prospective employees who have relations in the organization, 
or to those who have graduated from the University. This is very similar to Ansari 
and Bell’s (1991) findings in a Pakistani firm. The main characteristics of such a 
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collective society are collective decision-making processes (musyawarah), 
unanimous decisions (mufakat), co-operativeness (gotong royong), and loyalty.  
 
From the interview results it was also found that while some form of conflict exists 
among certain officials, this is not shown on the surface due to the need to maintain 
apparent peace with each other especially with senior members of institution/society. 
Thus, employees try to conceal any conflicts and negative feelings and therefore 
dysfunctional behavior is hardly demonstrated.  This is similar to Whitfield’s (2003) 
findings. He found employees in Indonesian organizations are reluctant to talk to a 
clear superior concerning problems or concerns in the performance of their own 
duties. In the organizations, any problem should be solved by the subordinate without 
informing the superior, which, as a result, spares him the unpleasant experience of 
receiving bad news.  
 
In day-to-day activities, employees have been influenced by the word Rukun. 
Rukun is an important Javanese word describing “a state in which all parties are at 
least overtly at social peace with one another." Reliance on informal procedures 
has resulted in the development of more and more personal relationships between 
subordinate and superior members of staff, causing the emergence of “ewuh 
pakewuh” culture. “Ewuh pakewuh” is a Javanese phrase, which means reluctance 
and failure among superiors to punish subordinates because of the development of 
familial relationships in the workplace. We explained in the case how superiors 
sometimes find it difficult to discipline subordinates because of the family 
relationship.Also, Javanese culture provides that conflicts are resolved through 
deliberation and negotiation, referred to as musyawarah. This concept, which is 
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the indigenous way of decision-making, thus renders the roles of formal 
management controls less relevant.  
 
Ansari and Bell’s (1991) work, based on Geertz (1983), argued that a formal control 
system was only necessary to legitimize the organization with external parties.  The 
formal rules and regulations only play the ceremonial role which is also reflected in 
trade union activities in our case study. The Indonesian labor laws fail to protect 
employees; hence the need to rely on social relations. In our case organization, a more 
powerful national labor union association was replaced by a less powerful internal 
labor union. The role of the labor union therefore changed from negotiating for the 
rights of employees to that of savings and loans, and coordinating lecturers’ activities 
such as seminars.  Dean (2001: 9) writes: “The Indonesian legal system by itself 
cannot be relied upon to secure contractual commitments or to secure property rights. 
The law is but one instrument to secure rights, and in the Indonesian context, it should 
be considered secondary to other more important instruments”.  For example, 
Indonesian labor law provides that technically, an employee can only be dismissed for 
misconduct, and the employee must first be given three separate warnings before any 
decision to dismiss him/her can be taken. However, management can avoid this 
process by handling the process through acceptable cultural principles such as 
negotiation, face-saving exit, or even money.  
 
Our arguments certainly rely on one case study and we do not wish to generalize 
these views to all settings. However, this case has highlighted some of the crucial 
culture issues that may well explain some managerial practices in Indonesian 
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organizations especially and less developed countries in general. Thus, we add to 
the small but growing body of empirical field research in this area.   
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Tables 
Table One: Relationship between Javanese cultural values and management controls  
Culture Definition Relevance to Management Controls 
Bapakism Javanese word which means paternalism 
and patronage. The father / elder demands 
respect, obedience and loyalty from 
subordinates 
The CEO makes all important decision in the 
organization such as recruitment, budgeting and 
cost decisions, employee relations and salary. 
Employees rarely question the CEO’s decisions. 
Rukun Javanese word which describes a state in 
which all parties at least overtly at social 
peace with one another. This is manifest 
through collective decision-making 
processes (musyawarah), unanimous 
decision (mufakat), co-operation (gotong-
royong) 
Centralized controls created some tensions 
among employees. However, the culture of rukun 
teaches them to maintain apparent peace with 
each other and try to conceal any conflicts and 
negative feelings. 
Ewuh 
Pakewuh 
Javanese Phrase, which means reluctance 
and failure among superiors to punish 
subordinates because of the development 
of familial relationships in the work place 
- Superiors failed to discipline their subordinates 
and let the CEO to solve all problems. 
- The use of informal channel or “oral culture” is 
a powerful source of vertical information in the 
organisation. 
 
 
 39
Figures 
 
Figure One: Formal Organizational Structure 
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Figure Two: The Control Structure 
 
 
 
(a) Formal Control Structure 
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1 Shanker and Astrachan (1996) provided three different categorizations of FOBs. First, the broad 
definition recognized an FOB as a business that the effective control of strategic direction remains in 
the family though there is little direct family involvement in the running of the business. The middle 
definition recognized an FOB as where the founder/descendants have legal control of voting stocks, run 
the business and there is some family involvement in the running of the business. The narrow definition 
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construed an FOB as where the family is directly involved in running the business with more than one 
owning family member having a significant responsibility and also a lot of family involved.   
2 It is interesting to note that 80% of the Indonesian Economy is controlled by the Indonesian-Chinese. 
They represent only 2% of the total population. Indonesian-Javanese represent 80% of the total 
population but only control fewer than 20% of the economy.  
3 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/id.html#People 
4 There are 583 languages and thousands of dialects  
5 Former President Soeharto is Javanese and the culture has a strong influence on him, for example: the 
use of Javanese words in day to day activities. 
6 Such difficulties are exacerbated by the tendency of some private HEIs to omit to submit their 
mandated University Statute, and Basic Plan for Development, to authorities for approval. Other non-
registered or new private HEIs, for example, ‘offer … study programs to the community, perform 
student admission and conduct teaching and learning process without making application for clearance 
or reports to the government.’ (Bray & Thomas, 1998, p. 43) Hence students may spend time studying 
subjects that have not been accredited by the authorities for that institution. Certainly, some 
applications for registration by private providers fail, as the recent decision (in April 2002) by the 
Directorate of Higher Education to refuse accreditation to Edtracon, a member of the World 
Association of Universities and Colleges, attests. 
7 All academic activities are under the control of the first Deputy CEO, who makes decisions 
concerning subjects to be taught. As a result, all the Heads of academic departments report to him 
8 The University officials are the senior officials such as Heads of Departments and officials in charge 
of services. These officials report directly to the CEO. 
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